From the earliest years of the conflict in Kashmir, militant organizations fighting for independence or accession to Pakistan have committed grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The most egregious of these abuses have been the murders of hundreds of civilians, both Muslim and Hindu, who have been targeted because of their suspected support for the Indian government, or because they' otherwise opposed the policies or practices of one or another of the militant groups.
There are no accurate statistics on the numbers of these killings and other abuses, but anecdotal evidence from Kashmir indicates that most of these abuses have increased since 1994. The rise in some abuses parallels a rise in crime generally by militant groups; many abductions and assaults appear to be linked to extortion. Members of some of the groups have also committed rape, have threatened and attacked journalists, and have kidnaped tourists and others as political hostages. As the groups have lost ground to the security forces, they have also increasingly made use of land mines and other explosive devices against the security forces, with predictable civilian casualties.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which is applicable to both government forces and armed insurgents in an internal armed conflict such as that in Kashmir, expressly prohibits "cruel treatment and torture" and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. " Explicit threats to kill are barred by these provisions. ' Rape by militant groups is a violation of international humanitarian law under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits murder, torture and ill-treatment of non-combatants by both government and militant forces. Armed militants have used rape as a weapon: to punish, intimidate, coerce, humiliate and degrade. The fear of rape has reportedly been a factor in the flight of Muslim families from Kashmir.
Militant organizations have issued threats against government officials assigned to prepare for the elections.
On April 16, 1996, the Hezb-ul Mujahedin threatened government officials making arrangements for the elections, stating that "any government official . . . found taking part in poll duties . . . will be dealt with severely. "" Various militant groups have employed threats to force shopkeepers, businesses and the media to desist from activities considered "un-Islamic" or detrimental to the militants' objectives. Targets of such threats have included liquor dealers and cinema hall owners, among others. Militant groups have also issued threats to journalists and have assaulted or kidnaped journalists whom they accuse of "biased" reporting. They have also issued bans on newspapers, and have enforced these bans through kidnapings of distributors and other assaults.
The criminal activities of the militant groups have alienated Kashmiris; many now openly condemn the groups' abusive behavior. Even political leaders aligned with militant groups have acknowledged that the abuses have undermined the militants' support in Kashmir. However, little, if anything, has been done to curb the abuses.
At least six major militant organizations, and perhaps dozens of smaller ones, operate in Kashmir. " They are roughly divided between those who support independence and those who support accession to Pakistan, and include both Kashmiri-groups and those made up largely of Afghan or Pakistani recruits. ' The oldest and most widely known militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), has spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. Its student wing is the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation front (JKSLF). In September 1995 the JKLF split into two factions, one of which remained loyal to long-time leader Amanullah Khan, who lives in Pakistan, and the other of which recognized JKLF leader Yasin Malik.
A large number of other militant organizations have emerged since 1989, some of which also support independence, others of which support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reputed to have been favored by Pakistan's military intelligence, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and by the Jamaat-e Islami party in Pakistan. The most powerful of these is the Hezb-ul Mujahedin. Other major groups include:
The militant forces do not control territory in Kashmir, but until 1995, certain parts of the valley had gained a reputation as strongholds of particular militant groups, particularly towns near the Line of Control which separates the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from the territory controlled by Pakistan. Since mid-1995, these groups have lost ground to regular Indian forces and to state-sponsored militias.
The militants' military operations are generally characterized by ambushes of security force patrols and convoys and hit-and-run attacks on security force bunkers and pickets, for which they generally use grenades, rocket- propelled grenade launchers and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Some militant groups have organized commando units responsible for attacking specific targets, such as security force bunkers. The militants also engage army troops and other security forces in gun battles. For these operations they rely on weapons such as AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles, light machine guns, revolvers and other light weapons. Since 1994, the militants have increasingly made use of land mines and timed explosive devices. The militants are also reported to have sophisticated night vision and wireless communication equipment. State authorities claim that nearly 13, 544 AK series assault rifles, 715 rocket launchers and 16,513 grenades have been recovered since 1990.
Much of this weaponry reaches Kashmir from Pakistan. Militant leaders have claimed that they have received support from Pakistan's ISI. " Although many long-time observers of the region believe that Pakistan has directly provided weapons to militants in Kashmir, there are many complexities about the arms supply relationship. Most of these weapons have come from the arms bazaar in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)-a vast black market for weapons-and members of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), operating either on their own or with the tacit or explicit complicity of the central Pakistani government. Many of the weapons acquired from these sources were siphoned off from U. S. arms transfers to Afghan mujahidin fighting Soviet forces-the so-called "Afghan pipeline" in which the U. S. funneled vast supplies of arms through the ISI to the Afghan resistance. " However, the extent to which the ISI actively assists and directs the flow of weapons from Pakistan to India remains unclear, as does the level of sanctioning authority within the ISI and the Pakistani government.
On May 16, 1994, The Washington Post reported that Pakistan had temporarily ceased direct support for Kashmiri insurgents in 1993 after the U. S. threatened to add it to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, which would trigger a severing of economic ties. The article also noted that during this period, Pakistan funneled support through "private organizations," frequently operated by former army and ISI officials. "Ostensibly private organizations have continued to supply arms to the militants, in operations overseen by the Pakistani army. Jamaat-I-Islami, the major Islamist political party in Pakistan, allegedly claimed in April 1994 that it collected 25 million rupees (almost one million dollars) in a nationwide fundraising campaign to support the militant cause in Kashmir. And, at times, the transfer of arms to Kashmiri militants may be carried out by members of the ISI without explicit authorization. " In addition to weapons supplies from the ISI and other official or quasi-official sources, it also appears that significant quantities of weapons are purchased through commercial channels, in particular through the arms bazaars in the NWFP.
In the years before tensions in Kashmir erupted into near-civil war, the JKLF and other militant groups deliberately targeted civilians for assassination. The principal targets included members of the Hindu community in Kashmir," civil servants and political figures, particularly Muslim political leaders associated with the National Conference party and other political groups opposed by the militants. Militant groups have also abducted and executed civilians, both Hindu and Muslim, whom they have accused of being government informers or of otherwise supporting the government of India. " As a matter of policy, militant groups summarily executed captured security personnel. These executions violate international humanitarian law.
Some groups, particularly but not exclusively those led by non-Kashmiri militants from Afghanistan or Pakistan, have also exploded bombs in buses and cars with the intention of killing civilians. Members of militant groups have used rocket-propelled launchers to fire grenades into government buildings of the civil administration, injuring and killing employees. Armed militant groups have also launched targeted bomb attacks against civilians in Jammu district and in Delhi.
A number of militant organizations have claimed responsibility for some of the assassinations, kidnapings and other attacks carried out by their forces in Kashmir. There are many other cases in which no group has taken responsibility, and it is impossible to say which of the many groups operating in the state have committed these abuses. In each of the cases described in this chapter, militants killed, assaulted or threatened civilians with death; these actions directly violate international humanitarian law, which protects civilians and other non-combatants from abuse.
There are no precise figures for the number of killings of this kind that have taken place since the conflict began. Government sources report that more than 4,000 civilians have been killed by militant groups since 1990, and another 6,000 injured. The cases described below are illustrative of the kind of murders of civilians that militant groups have committed and continue to commit.
The militants have also used threats to compel Hindu families and suspected political opponents to leave the Kashmir valley. Beginning in 1988, many Hindus were made the targets of threats and acts of violence by militant organizations, and this wave of killing and harassment motivated many to leave the valley. " With government assistance, a large part of the Hindu community in Kashmir, numbering more than I 00,000, left the valley in 1989- 90. 1 The threats have continued. According to a report in 1992, when one militant group, the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin, appealed for the Kashmiri Hindus to come back to the valley, two others, Al-Umar and Al-Jehad, immediately issued press releases warning them not to return. " Such threats and violence constitute violations of the laws of war, and Human Rights Watch/Asia was able to document many specific cases that occurred early in the conflict.
The killings of suspected police informers or others accused of undermining the militant's political or military objectives have been ordered by senior commanders of the militant organizations. While some individual militants may murder political rivals or carry out vendetta killings on their own, the assassinations of political figures and suspected government agents are carried out as a matter of policy.
A number of militant organizations have claimed responsibility for executions of suspected informers, political figures and civil servants. There are many other cases in which no group has taken responsibility, and it is impossible to say which, if any, of the many groups operating in the state may have committed the crime. Such executions have been reported frequently since 1990.
Militant leaders have admitted that they execute members of the security forces who have been captured by their forces. Such executions represent grave violations of international humanitarian law.
Common Article 3 prohibits not only murder but other forms of "violence to life and person," including violence that results in injury and not death. Militant bombings and grenade attacks on civilian government buildings and civilian transport vehicles are violations of the laws of war. Militants have also planted land mines on public roads, posing a serious risk to civilian traffic, including medical vehicles.
Kidnapings, long a favored tactic of some of the militant groups, has continued unabated. As this report went to press, three European and one American kidnaped by the little known Al-Faran group in July 1995 were still missing. The group executed a Norwegian hostage in August 1995. Less publicized have been the kidnapings of hundreds of Kashmiris by militant groups over the years. Many of these kidnapings have also ended in murder. The motives for kidnaping are both political and criminal: civilians have been held as hostages for detained colleagues, or as a means to extort funds from their families; many of these hostages have been murdered.
Common Article 3 prohibits the "taking of hostages. " The International Committee of the Red Cross commentary on Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions explains that hostages are persons
Since the conflict began, militants have engaged in frequent kidnapings of civilians, some of whom have been held as hostages for detained colleagues, or as a means of exerting pressure on family members of the victim who support a rival militant organization. Particularly in 1991, militant groups also kidnaped foreigners, apparently as a means to attract international attention. Militants have also kidnaped civilians in order to extort funds from their families. Human Rights Watch/Asia has documented numerous cases of kidnapings that occurred between 1989 and 1993. " According to government sources, over 2,000 persons have been kidnaped by militant groups since 1990, 548 in 1995 alone.
The most prominent case in 1995 was the kidnaping of five tourists by a previously-unknown militant group, Al-Faran. On July 4, 1995, two American tourists, Donald Hutchings and John Childs, and two British tourists, Paul Wells and Keith Mangan, were kidnaped near Pahalgam. Childs later managed to escape. Only July 8, Al-Faran kidnaped a German tourist, Dirk Hasert. The next day, one last hostage, a Norwegian, Hans Christian Ostro, was taken in the Zojibal area. For about two months, a tense dialogue was kept alive between Indian negotiators and Al- Faran, with the militant group demanding the release of twenty-one jailed militants including four senior leaders of different groups and refusing to compromise on their demands. "' Less than six weeks after the last hostage was taken, Ostro's body was found decapitated with the words "Al-Faran" carved on his back. The murder was widely condemned by other militant organizations in Kashmir and the all Parties Huriyat Conference. Undeterred, the group has repeatedly threatened to kill the remaining hostages . After the murder, commando forces were dispatched and negotiators from the U. S. and Britain were flown in to assist the Indian Security forces in locating the hostages. 'O' By October, New Delhi's credibility in handling the situation had been seriously damaged. Foreign diplomats claimed that the Indian government had begun censoring information that was exchanged between them and Al- Faran. "' As this report went to press, there was no further information about the fate of the remaining hostages.