2.1) Two Constraints

There is a sort of consensus in the strategic community that India's role is constrained mainly by two factors and unless these factors are not removed, India cannot take off in the role that is being envisaged for it in the NWO.77 The two factors are:

• India's subcontinental security preoccupations, mainly with Pakistan as a result of which India's policies and role becomes Pak-determined; and
• Threats to India's 'stability', about which the consensus opinion is that these threats are mostly internal78 arising from religious, cultural and racial conflicts.

2.1.1) The Constraints -- In What Sense ?

Before moving further, let us understand in what sense the above mentioned factors are constraints on India's role? What is meant by these two factors being constraints?

In the new international dispensation India as one of Asia's 'great' powers is supposed to 'devise a new form of strategic engagement with the wider Asian region'79 , coordinating and colluding in a bilateral and global context with the great powers like China, Japan, Russia and U.S. The relation of India with these powers should be independent of India's and these powers' relations with Pakistan or with India's other sub-continental neighbours. Now, if India's relations with other powers are determined by their relations with Pakistan which has been the case so far, this becomes a constraint on India's acting as one among the key states in the international system because this way India's subcontinental security concerns dominate its outlook and policies and it remains 'polarised on its immediate neighbourhood' 80

Security preoccupations with Pakistan keep the regional security environment tension-ridden. Although, there is no imminent threat of war, yet the Indian forces have got to be in a state of near-warlike readiness on the borders. On the other side, there is growing feeling among the strategic community in and outside India, that with India taking up a wider/global role a comprehensive and major defence and strategic debate must be initiated without which it is thought 'India may well miss the opportunity of playing a leadership role on the international scene.' 81 Through this debate, it is said India should 'rethink its fundamental security doctrine and planning' 82 and while moving ahead on the road of a modern military establishment and force, this debate should set out 'the purpose, shape and the use of that force.' 83 For such a major debate to start, India has to have a rather tension-free atmosphere which it cannot have while remaining embroiled in Kashmir and, therefore, preoccupied with Pakistan.'84

And, 'instability' being a constraint is quite understandable. Economic costs, political uncertainty and diplomatic embarrassment all go together with 'instability', which makes it a serious constraint in exercising wider role and influence.

2.1.2) A Closer Look at the Constraints: Kashmir a Crucial Factor

Let us now take a closer look at the two constraints mentioned above. It will turn out that Kashmir- the issue, the movement, the situation -- is one of the important factors -- indeed a crucial one -- behind both the constraints, namely, India's subcontinental security preoccupations as well as internal 'instability'. The factor of Kashmir operates in its two dimensions, namely historical and Islamic.

2.1.2.1) Kashmir Factor -- Historical Dimension

Kashmir is the main factor which makes Indian politics and it security outlook Pakistan centred or even Pakistan-determined. However, this needs to be properly understood, for it could otherwise suggest that Kashmir is the basic cause of India's hostility towards Pakistan and Pakistan poses a real security threat to India

Both of which are not true. First, Kashmir is not a cause, it is a consequence of Hindu elite mind's blind refusal to accept a sovereign Muslim presence in South Asian subcontinent. Grabbing Kashmir in 1947 through a well-planned design and scheme, was part of a determined bid by the Indian Hindu elites to defeat the establishment of Pakistan (which was emerging as a sovereign Muslim presence) as a viable entity after they had failed to defeat its creation in the first place85. Second, Pakistan is not a threat to India's security in any real sense of the term. All the political analysts agree on this.86 Then what is this security preoccupation with Pakistan and that also through Kashmir? The answer lies in the fact that Kashmir issue places subcontinental politics back in pre-47 context. Operating within that context the Hindu leadership views a live Kashmir issue as a continuation of the Muslim claim on the 'Mother India' (the territory under erstwhile British Indian Empire)87 , a claim that had earlier succeeded in 'extracting' Pakistan from the 'Mother' in 1947. This is no exaggeration to say that the ruling Hindu elites are still not reconciled to the very existence of Pakistan.88 However, one could presume that for some reason or the other the Hindu leadership would agree to tolerate its Muslim neighbour and thus overcome its pre-occupations with it, but Kashmir issue in its live form (i.e not resolved, not frozen) -- and for the past seven years it has been more than just live-- in an aggressive form -- works as an electrifying impulse on the Hindu mind, destabilising it and making it more and more preoccupied with its immediate neighbour Pakistan. So this way Kashmir lies at the centre of the first constraint, namely India's security preoccupations on the subcontinent. Likewise, Kashmir lies at the centre of another constraint namely internal 'instability'. Let us see how?

There are numerous divisions and tensions found in India on caste, religious-cultural, linguistic, regional and tribal lines. These tensions constitute the potential conflicts and threaten the 'stability' of the Indian state. All these conflicts are not current, they are historical, most of them rooted in the genesis of present Indian nation-state--- a process during which Gandhi very cunningly managed to carve out an artificial pan-Indian identity at the cost of a number of real identities based on caste, religion, region, language etc. etc. . This is a historical fact that for a considerable period of time after independence in 1947, Indian ruling elites, on a priority basis worked on devising ways and means to neutralize conflicts and thus overcome 'instability' that was inbuilt into the Indian nation-state borne in 1947.89 In fact, this process is still on.90 Kashmir in its historical dimension, takes the political debate back to the point in history when sub-continent was going to be politically reorganised consequent to the end of British rule. Since this reorganization when it came about was highly inequitable--- a tiny minority of educated westernised Hindus, mostly Brahmins grabbing a major chunk of territory (after unsuccessfully trying hard to grab the whole sub-continent) now known as India--- it created more problems than it solved. The question of the future of so many nationalities remained unresolved. A live Kashmir issue brings into sharp focus the inequitable nature and hence the non-finality of 1947 settlement, by raising the question of the political future of Kashmir that is yet to be decided. Now since India has forcibly occupied Kashmir and, therefore, it happens to be a de facto part of India, such a message emanating from a 'part' sends highly 'destabilising' impulses throughout the whole of India. It may not turn them into full-fledged liberation movements but it definitely aggravates the already existing tensions and potential conflicts in India. The process of growing social cleavages and the vivisection around the question of identities in India and the 1996 general elections being reflective of this process has been noted by Indian political scientists. They have noted this significant development also that political parties and groups in India are becoming the representatives of social classes,91 and this is a prelude to 'separatism'. How much these developments are influenced by the movement and the issue of Kashmir needs to be properly worked out on the basis of objective research. At the moment, to my knowledge, such a research study does not exist, but that does not constitute a reason for me not to link the ongoing social change in India to the inherent 'destabilising' potential of Kashmir issue. So it is this way that Kashmir lies at the centre of another constraining factor namely 'instability'. Again, instability in India creates more and more regional preoccupations particularly with Pakistan. The more instabilities there are, the more is the Indian ruling elites' mind preoccupied with Pakistan.

2.1.2.2) Kashmir Factor--- The Islamic Dimension

A very basic truth to know about the Indian nation-state is that its underlying nationalist thought is based on a key-perception that there was a Hindu Golden age in ancient times and it is Muslims who disrupted it. The Indian 'freedom' movement meant for its initiator Gandhi a return to the golden age of 'Ram Rajya'92 ('Ram Rajya' means 'The rule of Ram'-- a name given by some Hindus to one of their chief gods). And when in 1947, the Muslims of north-western and far eastern parts of the sub-continent got their sovereign home land, it confirmed the fear of Hindu elites that Islam stood in the way of their dreams: Muslims defeated their plans to grab the whole subcontinent. The ruling Hindu elites of India regard Islam as a disruptive force, both, historically as well as geo-politically. They not only hate it, they are equally terrified by it. They cannot look at Islam except as a threat. So far, this threat was perceived to be external--- in the form of Pakistan, and internal--- in he form of massive Muslim population inside India, but now, in the global Islamic activism, India sees a 'transnational' form of this threat also, emerging from every part of the world and closing in on India itself (cf. 1.4.4.1 and fn. 70 below). This active 'transnational threat' activates the dormant 'internal threat' and in this process of activation the Hindu elites see the hand of the 'external threat' (i.e Muslim neighbours Pakistan and Bangladesh). The circuit is complete, but again Kashmir works as the exacerbating factor. Kashmir being the theatre of activism, becomes the focus for Islamic forces world-wide to converge on, and the defiant mood (i.e Muslim youth up in arms) there easily captures the young Muslim minds throughout India. Thus Kashmir in its Islamic dimension exacerbates India's 'internal Islamic threat'. It aggravates a factor considered to be the most volatile factor in the 'stability' of Indian State--- the Muslim factor. This substantially contributes to India's 'instability' and greater the fears of 'instability' greater remains India's preoccupation with its Muslim neighbours.