6) Conclusions and Recommendation

a) Given the fact that:

India wants to get rid of Kashmir problem instead of resolving it,

and

The west, particularly U.S is supporting these moves, our main burden in this paper was to investigate what motivates India's moves and U.S support of it. What emerged after a very detailed discussion, is that the whole Indian exercise and the U.S interest has to be seen against the backdrop of India's emerging role in the global political order. In the NWO India is emerging as one of the key players with a wider 'security' role in the Asian region and this makes it necessary that India be freed of all those immediate regional 'irritants' which presently act as constraints on its wider role by keeping it embroiled in its immediate neighbourhood. It also emerged that Kashmir is the main 'irritant' and the most crucial factor in exacerbating a host of other factors that give rise to (i) 'instability' of Indian State, and (ii) India's regional 'security' preoccupations, particularly with Pakistan---- the two main constraints on India's emerging role. The most important truth that emerges from the whole discussion is that given the political, economic, strategic and security considerations in the NWO, the West is developing a vested interest in the integrity and stability of India. This leads to an important conclusion that West will not allow Kashmir's complete independence from India, which in turn leads to yet another inescapable conclusion that a movement for the freedom of Kashmir (in or outside the occupied land) cannot, and, therefore, must not be premised on the support of the West. If it is, it cannot resolve the issue; it can further complicate it and that too at a very high human cost.

b) Towards the end we also looked at India's present activism in Kashmir---- holding elections, announcing the grant of internal autonomy etc. etc.

It turned out that all these moves are geared towards strengthening the deteriorating position of India in Kashmir through the restoration of NC. What we should basically conclude now is that India has after all succeeded in changing the very field of action in Kashmir. In 1989 the armed freedom movement offered India a field with its own ground-rules; now it is India who is laying out the field. Its ground rules are laid by India and agenda set by it. Some oppose the agenda, some favour it, but all are essentially the players in same field. For example NC contested the elections, APHC opposed them but all shared the same common field---- the field of 'democratic competition'. This change of field did not come about overnight; it came through a long process, the description of which we deliberately choose to avoid here, although this writer has been a close witness to this process and its known opponent in occupied Kashmir. What needs to be understood is that the new field of action is inherently tilted towards the empowerment of India. Indeed that is precisely the objective for which it has been designed in the first place. The Freedom Movement is necessarily bound to be a casualty in this field. The reason is that although this field is apparently made out to be a field of 'democratic competition', yet in reality it is not. The designers of this field give out an impression that things are decided only on the basis of argument and logic. India also goes to the people, APHC also goes and it is upto them i.e the people to decide what to do and what not. There is no force, no coercion. But here exactly lies the trap. Does India engage in a democratic process after disbanding its armed forces? If gun introduces an element of force or coercion into an otherwise field of argument and logic, what about Indian gun? India retains its militancy which it calls armed forces, and calls for the armed force of the freedom movement which it calls militancy, to be 'crushed' before a democratic process can begin. So in this field of 'democratic competition' India is not only with the gun, all its political activism is on the basis of the gun; on the other hand the freedom movement is not only without the gun, it has to be seen to be opposed to the gun in order to be an acceptable player in this new field. Thus the new field of action by the very nature of its ground rules overwhelmingly favours India and pro-India forces. In such a situation, the long and medium term options for completely defeating the Indian State can be worked out only after a serious re-think. However, in the short term, there are still options for APHC to exercise. Their chief option, the effectivity of which depends on their capability, is the management and manipulation of the military threat that has emanated from the armed movement operating in Kashmir for the past seven years. This is a standard option exercised by all the modern liberation movements and the recent instances where it has been successfully used are the Sinn Fein (the parent political party of Irish Republican army IRA in Northern Ireland) and the African National Congress (ANC). The option works like this: Once an armed movement starts its military operations, three things are demonstrated namely

• (i) existence of armed group(s),
• (ii) possession of arms and ammunition by the group(s)
• (iii) capability and will of the group(s) to hurt enemy targets and interests. These three things create a threat, which the enemy, under no circumstances, affords to write-off even if the actual use of force is suspended. In inter-state relations also, the hostile states never ignore each other's threat even if they are on peaceful terms. In case of guerrilla armed movements however, the threat is taken more seriously by the enemy because unlike regular armed forces of the states, the force levels of an armed movement remain secret---- not being documented in military journals or monitored by institutions and agencies. Based on the logic that an armed movement can never be fully eliminated, its threat always persists until the problem (which had given rise to the movement) is politically resolved. This places the political managers of the liberation movement always in a position to constantly manage and manipulate the threat to the best of their advantage. This option is still available to APHC. The crucial factor is their political skill but more than that their seriousness of intentions and will i.e How serious and determined are they to defeat India? This option is otherwise there for APHC to exercise to the best advantage of Kashmiri people and the movement.

c) In the course of discussion, it also turned out that it is basically Pakistan which has made India to remain preoccupied in its immediate vicinity. It may not be so much due to the policies of Pakistan as due to its mere existence. This may lead one to conclude that Pakistan has a crucial role to play in the emerging political-strategic scenario in South Asia. Historically, Pakistan symbolises a clear defiance of the Hindu hegemony over post-British South Asia. In its essence Pakistan movement, in a wider sense, represented a way to a dignified post-colonial future not only for Muslims of South Asia but for all other distinct nationalities of the region as well. These nationalities like Sikhs and Dalits for example also struggled in their own ways, but it was for some definite reasons that Muslims alone could succeed, at least to a considerable extent. However, the temporary failure of these nationalities in pre-47 period, does not mean that they are for ever destined to be the slaves of Brahmins or other 'high caste' Hindu elites nor does it mean that Pakistan should cease to be the vanguard of the movement for the emancipation of all these deprived communities. True, Pakistan is too weak to shoulder such great responsibilities. A strong and fully autonomous state has yet to develop in Pakistan. Right from the intellectual to the common man the question that is very often asked in Pakistan is, "who governs this God-given country?" But whatever the reality, the fact remains that the historical and geo-strategic position in which Pakistan exists, there is no substitute to it. Pakistan has to be made to deliver what it does not or cannot at the moment, but what history has chosen it for. For this to happen many an efforts are needed. One, for example, is that the political agenda and discourse in Pakistan should develop on very substantial basis along specific lines and around vital and important themes.

d) An important point that emerged from the discussion is that the ruling Hindu elites in India have a strong animus against Islam. This is something Muslims world-wide, particularly those struggling for the political goals of Islam should take a serious note of. Moreover, in this regard Iran has to be very careful about its relations with India. The most important thing is that Iran should have a very clear and correct view of the reality that India represents. It should be very clear about its core objectives and interests in its relationship with India and should have a very clear view of the scope and the limitations of this relationship. For example Iran should never look at this relationship as a strategic tie-up against U.S. There is absolutely no reason to think so. As to India, it is very clear-minded about its relation with Iran. Its chief interest is to isolate Pakistan and gain access into Central Asia, where its cultural and economic interests are considered to be 'very substantial' and with which Tehran provides a 'vital link.'115 Iran should, by word and deed, show a strong contempt for India's great power ambitions, and it should be seen as such by the people of the world, particularly Muslims. India's recent stand on CTBT was not an act of defiance against U.S, but a strong assertion of its 'great power' ambition. The whole bogey of global disarmament was an exercise in sheer hypocrisy, which should have been rejected by Islamic Iran with the contempt that it deserved.